Remarriage After Decree Imposing Waiting Period - Henderson v. Henderson by unknown
Maryland Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 4 Article 6
Remarriage After Decree Imposing Waiting Period
- Henderson v. Henderson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Remarriage After Decree Imposing Waiting Period - Henderson v. Henderson, 14 Md. L. Rev. 358 (1954)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol14/iss4/6
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Moreover, placing the decision on apparent authority
grounds leaves the reasoning open to criticism as to whether
a guest really accepts the invitation because of reliance on
the master's assent to the holding out. One editor says:
"In point of fact it would seem that ordinarily one
who gets the servant's permission to ride is quite satis-
fied therewith; and in most cases it would be remark-
able to picture such a person as acting on the permis-
sion or invitation only because he understands that it
comes from the master. '2 1
Whether the decision is categorized as based on apparent
or actual authority, it is submitted that it is sound. For
the rule protecting a master from liability for injury to un-
authorized invitees of the servant is an effort to keep within
reasonable bounds the very broad risks incident to the
master's sending his servant out on business with an auto-
mobile. Yet, where the master has actual knowledge of
the invitation in advance, no risk in addition to those con-
templated is incurred, and the general rule should apply.
REMARRIAGE AFTER DECREE IMPOSING
WAITING PERIOD'
Henderson v. Henderson2
Plaintiff-appellee-wife filed a bill in equity to obtain a
divorce a mensa et thoro from defendant-appellant-husband
alleging that the defendant, who, as she claimed, married
her in Iowa in 1943, had committed cruelty and construc-
tive desertion. In a cross-bill for an annulment of their
marriage, defendant alleged that the Iowa marriage was
invalid inasmuch as plaintiff was then'still under the dis-
ability of an effective prohibition against remarriage in a
"Note, 2 A. L. R. 2d 406, 422. See also dissent in De Parcq v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 8upra, n. 17, dis. op. 781.
1For leading articles on the subject of marriage in Maryland, see
Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriage8 in Maryland and Their Annulment,
2 Md. L. Rev. 211 (1938), and Strahorn, Fifteen Yeara of Change in Mary-
land Marriage and Annulment Law and Dome8tic Relation8 Procedure8, 13
Md. L. Rev. 128 (1953).
2 199 Md. 449, 87 A. 2d 403 (1951). This case Is cited In Milton v. Escue,
201 Md. 190, 202, 93 A. 2d 258 (1952), as authority for the proposition that
the Court of Appeals will recognize the validity of a common-law marriage
arising in a jurisdiction which recognizes the validity of such marriages;
noted, 13 Md. L. Rev. 261 (1953), on this point.
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Virginia divorce decree,8 of which he was at that time
unaware. At the trial it was shown that the parties co-
habited as husband and wife in the District of Columbia
from the Spring of 1945 until June, 1946. The Chancellor
granted plaintiff a divorce a mensa et thoro and other re-
lief sought.4 Defendant's cross-bill was dismissed, and he
appealed. Held: Decree affirmed.
This case presents three main questions: (1) was the
marriage performed in Iowa within the prohibited period
of six months void; (2) if the Iowa marriage was void, had
the parties entered into a common-law marriage elsewhere;
and (3) if there was a common-law marriage, should it be
recognized in Maryland? The Court of Appeals answered
all three questions in the affirmative.
The first question brought before the Court the Virginia
decree, imposing the waiting period, which was entered in
accordance with the Virginia statute,5 which provided:
"On the dissolution of the bond of matrimony for
any cause arising subsequent to the date of the mar-
riage, neither party shall be permitted to marry again
for six months from the date of such decree, and such
bond of matrimony shall not be deemed to be dissolved
as to any marriage subsequent to such decree, or in any
prosecution on account thereof, until the expiration of
such six months."
Whether a marriage of a divorced person within the
prohibited period after divorce is void or merely voidable
depends on the language of the statute and the construc-
tion given to it by the courts." The Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia held' in 1923 that a marriage of a person,
who had been divorced in Virginia, within six months after
the date of the decree, is absolutely void, even though the
marriage is performed in another state, because the lan-
guage of the statute making the decree effective only after
the expiration of six months is entitled to full faith and
' The decree, dated Sept. 27, 1943, provided "that the bonds of matrimony
which were created by ithe aforesaid marriage be and the same are hereby
dissolved; but neither party hereto shall be permitted to marry again for a
period of six months from the date of this decree"; supra, n. 2, 451.
4 Custody of the child of their marriage was awarded plaintiff, with the
right to defendant 'to see the child at reasonable times. Defendant was
ordered to pay alimony, support of the child, and plaintiff's counsel fee;
supra, n. 1, 450-1.
"Virginia Code (1919), Sec. 5113; Code of Virginia (1950), Sec. 20-118.
'Hall v. Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 153 S. E. 293, 69 A. L. R. 527 (1930);
Schuchart v. Schuchart, 61 Kans. 597, 60 P. 311 (1900).1 Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S. E. 316, 32 A. L. R. 1088 (1923).
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credit in every other state.8 However, in Dimpfel v. Wilson9
the Maryland Court of Appeals took the position that a
decree of divorce prohibiting the defendant from remarry-
ing during the lifetime of the plaintiff had no effect beyond
the limits of the state in which such decree was made, and
did not in itself render invalid the remarriage of the defen-
dant in another state, when such marriage would other-
wise be valid, thereby lining up with the rule generally
recognized throughout the country at that time that such
a prohibition has no extraterritorial effect.10 In Van Voorhis
v. Brintnall" it was held that the statutes prohibiting the
second marriage of the person divorced on the ground of
adultery, during the lifetime of the former spouse, and
declaring such second marriage void, had no application,
as they were in the nature of a penalty, and had no effect
outside of the state, in the absence of express terms show-
ing a legislative intent to give them such effect. In Ban-
nister v. Bannister,2 however, the Court of Appeals quoted
with approval from Harrison v. State' as follows:
"'The right to confirm is the necessary corollary of
a power to dissolve marriage by divorce... Where the
parties contracting marriage labor under legal disa-
bilities, the contract is liable to be dissolved by the
Courts or affirmed by the Legislature'."
Assuming, as it here did, without deciding, that the
Iowa marriage was void, the Court of Appeals had no diffi-
culty disposing of the second question. Acknowledging
that common-law marriages are recognized in the District
of Columbia, 14 the Court of Appeals cited Thomas v.
Murphy and Parrella v. Parrella,6 holding that the re-
Federal Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 1.
'107 Md. 329, 68 A. 501 (1908).
10 The Court of Appeals in that case, ibid, 336, said:
"It is one thing to prohibit a marriage and declare it null and void if
made under certain conditions, and quite another thing to authorize a
divorce - thereby making it voidable only and not ab initio void."
286 N. Y. 18, 40 Am. Rep. 505 (1881).
-1181 Md. 177, 180, 29 A. 2d 287 (1942). Appellant here contended that
his marriage to the appellee was not valid in Maryland because it took
place before the appellee's interlocutory decree of divorce, in California,
had become final. The Court of Appeals, however, held the marriage valid
in view of a statute passed by the state of domicil where the divorce was
granted empowering courts to make nuno pro tune orders in certain cases
where steps to make the decree final had not been taken. Noted in 7 Md. L.
Rev. 254 (1943).
1122 Md. 468, 493, 85 Am. Dec. 658 (1864).
14 See Thomas v. Holtzman, 7 Mackey 62, 66, 18 D. C. 62, 66 (1888).
107 F. 2d 268 (C. A., D. C., 1939).
10120 F. 2d 728 (C. A., D. C., 1941).
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moval of an impediment to marriage while parties continue
to live together as husband and wife in the District of
Columbia gives rise to a common-law marriage. 7 The co-
habitation of the parties as husband and wife in the Dis-
trict of Columbia from the Spring of 1945 until June, 1946,
cannot be explained on any theory other than that they
agreed to be husband and wife, thereby entering into a
common-law marriage under the law of the District of
Columbia.
As to the third question - whether the common-law
marriage should be recognized in Maryland - the Court of
Appeals applied the general rule."8 It is desirable that there
should be uniformity in the recognition of the marital
status, so that persons legally married according to the
laws of one state will not be held to be living in adultery
in another, and that children begotten in lawful wedlock
in one state will not be held illegitimate in another.19 The
state has the sovereign power to regulate marriages, and
accordingly can determine who shall assume and who shall
occupy the matrimonial relation within its borders. Such
effect as may be given by one state to the marriage laws of
another is merely because of comity, or because public
policy and justice demand the recognition of such laws.20
However, the state is not bound to give effect to marriage
laws which are repugnant to its own laws and policy.
Marriages which are tolerated in another state but are con-
demned by the State of Maryland as contrary to its public
policy will not be held valid in this state.2 The statutory
provisions for solemnizing marriages relate to form and
ceremony and do not cause a marriage entered into in some
other jurisdiction to fall within the general rule that a mar-
1 See also McVicker v. McVicker, 130 F. 2d 837 (C. A., D. C., 1942), where
the parties were married in Virginia before the end of the six months
waiting period described by the decree which divorced the husband from
his former wife, but relying on the ceremonial marriage lived together as
husband and wife in the District of Columbia more than two years. Held -
that the removal of the impediment to marriage while the parties con-
tinued to live together as husband and wife gave rise to a common-law
marriage.
8 Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17, 28, 33 A. 317 (1895) ; Bannister v. Ban-
nister, supra, n. 12.1 9 Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 8 Am. Dec. 131 (1819); Lando v.
Lando, 112 Minn. 257, 127 N. W. 1125 (1910).
10 Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corporation, 173 Va. 425, 4 S. E. 2d
364, 127 A. L. R. 430 (1939), criticized in 18 N. Car. L. Rev. 130 (1940).
"An illustration of this exception to the general rule arises from the
Maryland statute declaring void any marriage of a white person to a negro.
In Jackson v. Jackson, 8upra, n. 18, 30, the Court of Appeals said that,
although such marriages may be valid elsewhere, they will be absolutely
void in Maryland as long as the statutory prohibition remains unchanged.
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riage valid where solemnized or contracted is valid every-
where. The Court of Appeals has adopted the generally
accepted rule that a valid common-law marriage entered
into in a jurisdiction which recognizes its validity will be
recognized as valid in another, regardless of the rule pre-
vailing in the latter jurisdiction as to the validity of com-
mon-law marriages.2
Returning to the question which the Maryland Court
of Appeals did not have to decide, i. e., whether the Iowa
marriage was valid or void, there is found to be consider-
able conflict and confusion of decision and theory in the
reported cases as to the effect of a prohibited remarriage
in a state other than that in which the divorce was ob-
tained. It has been held 23 that where a party to a divorce
went to another state and married there in violation of
the prohibition against remarriage in the divorce decree,
and the parties then moved to a third state, the marriage
was void there in view of the full faith and credit pro-
vision of the Federal Constitution. In that case it was said
that the marriage would not be recognized by the courts
of a third state where the parties became domiciled, where
the laws of such third state evince the same public policy
as the state of the divorce as to remarriage. The opinion
noted:
"Reasonable restrictions against speedy remarriage
of divorced parties are becoming more common in the
statutes of our states, and their intentional violation
should find no sanction in states having similar re-
strictions. Only by each state enforcing public policies
common to it and other states can our divorce laws be
freed from the odium of being wilfully violated with
impunity."
On the other hand there are decisions24 holding that a mar-
riage will be recognized as valid in the third state although
a statute or decree of divorce of one state prohibited it and
the marriage took place in another state.
Where a decree of divorce must under the Federal Con-
stitution be given full faith and credit in another state,
2Whitehurst v. Whitehurst, 156 Md. 610, 145 A. 204 (1929).
tHall v. Industrial Commission, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312, 314 (1917).
U Goodwin v. Goodwin, 158 App. Div. 171, 142 N. Y. Supp. 1102 (1913) ;
Criss v. Industrial Commission, 348 Ill. 75, 180 N. E. 572 (1932) ; Fisch v.
Marler, 1 Wash. 2d 698, 97 P. 2d 147 (1939) ; Bauer v. Abrahams, 73 Colo.
509, 216 P. 259 (1923).
[VOL. XIV
HENDERSON v. HENDERSON
this means not "some" but "full" faith and credit. Thus, if
a state is required to give full faith and credit to the decree
at all it should give such recognition to every portion of it.
Hence, a prohibition against remarriage enforcible in the
state where the decree is granted should likewise be en-
forcible in every other state. Despite what has just been
said, however, up to now the decisions reported5 have
largely been to the contrary. Where a party is forbidden
by a divorce decree to remarry and goes to another state
and there marries, that marriage is usually recognized not
only in the state where it is performed but also in the state
where the decree of divorce was granted.
In Dimpfel v. Wilson26 a prohibition in a decree of di-
vorce rendered in New York, against the remarriage of the
guilty party during the life of the innocent one, was held
not to constitute a restraint within the meaning of an Act
of Congress applicable to the District of Columbia, so as
to make it a ground for divorce that the marriage was con-
tracted while either of the parties had a former husband
or wife living. The Court of Appeals observed that the
policy for Maryland was that no such prohibition should
be imposed, and that there could be no reason for its courts
construing such a statute to be extraterritorial, but added
that the result in this case should be governed by the law
of the District of Columbia when the marriage took place,
and the construction placed on the New York statute, when
the decree was passed. It will be observed that in Dimpfel
v. Wilson the inquiry was, in the main, directed to the ques-
tion of the effect of the prohibition in the New York decree
upon the validity of the marriage according to the law of
the District of Columbia, whereas in most of the cases (in-
cluding the present case under comment), in which the
question of the validity of the remarriage arose in a third
state, the issue discussed has been merely whether the
court of the forum would accord extraterritorial effect to
the prohibition in the decree, and there has been no specific
consideration of the question of whether such prohibition
in the foreign decree would affect the validity of the re-
marriage, tested by the law of the place where it was
celebrated.
Among the many decisions holding that a statutory prohibition against
the remarriage of a divorced person has no extra territorial effect may be
cited the following: Goodwin v. Goodwin, ibid; Dudley v. Dudley, 151 Iowa
142, 130 N. W. 785 (1911) ; Dimpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 329, 68 A. 561 (1908);
Pickard v. Pickard, 45 N. W. 2d 269 (Iowa, 1950).
2 Ibid.
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In the absence of statute27 to the contrary, after the
granting of an absolute divorce, either party may remarry,
but this rule does not apply until the divorce has become
final. Even in states having statutes prohibiting remar-
riage, it is clear that the parties may remarry each other
following a divorce.28 There seems to be no doubt as to the
power of the states to enact a statute prohibiting remar-
riage within a certain time after the decree, and such a stat-
ute has been held constitutional. 29 In some cases the pro-
hibition prevents remarriage unless the court grants an
order giving leave to the parties. Under such a statute0
the court has power, upon a showing of good behavior, to
permit the prohibited party to remarry. Other statutes"'
impose a time limit upon remarriage and permit remarriage
after the expiration of that period. Statutes in other states
prohibit the guilty party from remarrying during the life-
time of the innocent one 2 or prohibit either or both parties
from ever remarrying. 3 These statutes can apparently all
be sustained under the general authority which the state
has over the marriage of its citizens.
The effect of a remarriage in violation of a statute or
decree depends largely upon the statute itself. In some
cases such a remarriage has been held to be void where it
took place within the state where the divorce was granted;
in other jurisdictions such marriages have been held void-
able only. Moreover, it has been held:'- that where the stat-
ute forbids such a marriage without declaring it void, it
will not be so held as the law favors the validity of mar-
riages wherever possible.
Where a marriage is void at the time it is entered into,
it cannot be validated at a time when validity can result
without in some manner taking the necessary steps for a
new marriage. Thus, a marriage illegal because entered
into contrary to a prohibition against remarriage within a
certain period from the date of the decree of divorce does
not become legal by the cohabitation of the parties after
21Maryland and the following states have no such statute: Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming.
2 Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 7 S. W. 2d 783 (1928).1 Hobbs v. Hobbs, 279 Ill. 163, 116 N. E. 629 (1917).
" Garner v. Garner, 56 Md. 127 (1881).
1Supra, n. 6.
82 Cole v. Parton, 172 Tenn. 8, 108 S. W. 2d 884 (1937).
Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938).Woodward v. Blake, 38 N. D. 38, 164 N. W. 156 (1917).
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the expiration of the period, but this rule is not applied
where, as in the case-under comment, the subsequent co-
habitation satisfies the requirements of a common-law mar-
riage. Where a marriage is void if entered into by one of
the parties after the divorce but within the prohibited
period and where common-law marriages are void, a re-
marriage remains void although the parties continue to live
together as man and wife after the termination of the pro-
hibited period.8 5 The mere belief of the guilty party that
he has a right to remarry does not make his marriage valid.
It was formerly the general view that such prohibitions
on remarriage had no effect whatever on marriages solem-
nized in another jurisdiction, but the courts are gradually
taking a less liberal view so that now such marriages, al-
though still upheld where made, are frequently dicounte-
nanced in the state of domicil, especially where the parties
went to the other state for the purpose of avoiding the pro-
hibition. Every state has power to enact laws to personally
bind its citizens while in a foreign jurisdiction and to de-
clare that marriage between its citizens in foreign states in
disregard of the statutes of their state of domicil will not
be recognized in the courts of the latter state though valid
where celebrated. Thus, where a statute is enacted with a
positive incapacity for marriage, a marriage contracted in
disregard of the statutory prohibition wherever contracted
may in some cases be held void. 6 This is particularly true
where the parties have gone to the other jurisdiction for
the purpose of remarriage and to avoid the prohibition.
In many cases statutes prohibiting the marriage of the
party at fault have been construed as penal in nature and
have no extraterritorial effect.8 In this view marriages
contracted outside the state have been considered valid in
states having such statutes. There are many decisions hold-
ing that a statute prohibiting the remarriage of a divorced
person have no extraterritorial effect and, therefore, a mar-
riage celebrated in another state in violation of such pro-
hibition is valid. In some of these decisions it was held that
a prohibition on remarriage was effective only in the juris-
8 Wilson v. Cook, 256 Ill. 460, 100 N. E. 222 (1912).
'0Wilson v. Cook, ibid; Atkeson v. Woodmen of the World, 90 Okla. 154,
216 P. 467 (1923); Brand v. State, 242 Ala. 15, 6 So. 2d 446 (1941);
Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S. E. 316, 32 A. L. R. 1088 (1923).
87Knoll v. Knoll, 104 Wash. 110, 176 P. 22, 11 A. L. R. 1391 (1918).
Moughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216 (1933) ; In re Green's Estate, 155
Misc. 641, 280 N. Y. Supp. 692 (1935), aff'd. 246 App. Div. 583, 284 N. Y.
Supp. 370 (1935); Montgomery v. Gable, 61 Ga. App. 859, 7 S. E. 2d 426
(1940).
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diction where the decree was granted and did not invalidate
a marriage in another jurisdiction.8 9
Where the prohibited remarriage is solemnized not in
the domicil of the parties where the divorce was granted,
but in another state, the weight of authority4" seems to be
to the effect that a statute prohibiting a divorced party from
remarrying has no extraterritorial effect. This means that
if the marriage is valid in the state where it is solemnized,
it will be recognized in the state in which the divorce was
obtained.
It has been stated4' to be the rule that the validity of a
marriage is to be determined by the law of the state where
it is entered into. If valid there, it is to be recognized as
valid in the courts of the domicil unless contrary to the
prohibitions of natural law or the express prohibitions of
its statutes. Some courts have laid down a different rule,
holding that a marriage by one forbidden to remarry, cele-
brated in a state to which the parties go to avoid the pro-
hibition, will not be recognized in the state where the
divorce was granted. This is particularly true where it is
obvious that the sole purpose of marrying in the foreign
state is to avoid the statutory prohibition.42 Generally
speaking, however, such marriages have been held void
because of the statutory provisions by which they are
prohibited.4"
Where the party prohibited from remarrying leaves the
state in which the divorce was granted and goes to another
state, not for the purpose of remarrying, but with the bona
fide intention of changing his residence and acquiring a
new domicil, the marriage will likely be held valid.44 There
are, however, decisions to the contrary.5 Where one of the
parties to the remarriage was innocent it was held4 6 in a
For such example, see Dimpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 329, 68 A. 561 (1908).
'o WARREN, SCHOULER DIVORCE MANUAL (1944), p. 483.
1Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, 40 Am. Rep. 505 (1881) ; Thorp v.
Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602 (1882).
'Brand v. State, 8upra, n. 36. The RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934), See. 129, holds the view that if the marriage is otherwise valid, it is
not invalid because the parties to the marriage went into another state in
order to avoid the requirements of the law of their domicil.
" Atkeson v. Woodmen of the World, supra, n. 36; Bennebt v. Anderson,
20 Tenn. App. 523, 101 S. W. 2d 148 (1936) ; Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wash. 2d
698, 97 P. 2d 147 (1939) ; Wheelock v. Wheelock, 103 Vt. 417, 154 A. 665
(1931) ; Huard v. McTeigh, 113 Or. 279, 232 P. 658, 39 A. L. R. 528 (1925);
Royal v. Royal, 324 Mass. 613, 87 N. E. 2d 850 (1949).
"Owen v. Owen, 178 Wis. 609, 190 N. W. 363, 32 A. L. R. 1100 (1922);
Webster v. Modern Woodmen of America, 192 Iowa 1376, 186 N. W. 659
(1922).
"Such as Newman v. Kimbrough, 59 S. W. 1061 (Tenn., 1900).
"Gardner v. Gardner, 232 Mass. 253, 122 N. E. 308 (1919).
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state not ordinarily recognizing marriages in violation of
prohibitions that the marriage might be valid.
The Restatement47 gives the rule concerning the remar-
riage after one party to a divorce is forbidden to remarry
as follows:
"If, by a decree of divorce validly granted in one
state, one party is forbidden for a certain time or dur-
ing his life to marry again, and he goes into another
state and marries in accordance with the law of that
state, the marriage, unless invalid for other reasons, is
valid everywhere, even in the state in which the di-
vorce was granted."
The Restatement, however, distinguishes this case from one
where the decree is provisional only until the lapse of a
certain time, or is a decree nisi, or is an interlocutory de-
cree, which does not become absolute until after further
proceedings or the lapse of a certain time, in which case
neither party ceases to be married until the expiration of
the given time, and neither can marry again in any state,
since such marriage would be bigamous. Where the statute
of the state of domicil of one or both parties prohibits both
of them from remarrying for a stated time or during the life
of the other party after a divorce granted in such state
and that statute is by its provisions applicable to a mar-
riage of a domiciliary in another state or if it is interpreted
by the court as being applicable, the remarriage in the
other state by such a domiciliary will be invalid every-
where. If a person so prohibited from remarrying changes
his domicil, the statute will no longer be applicable to the
remarriage of such person. However, if the divorce is
granted at the domicil of one party only, a statute prohibit-
ing the remarriage of the parties, even when interpreted as
applicable to a remarriage in another state, will not prevent
the party not domiciled in that state from remarrying in
another state.
The Restatement view4 8 that a marriage which is against
the law of the state of domicil of either party, although the
requirement of the law of the state of celebration has been
complied with, will be invalid everywhere if the marriage
is polygamous, incestuous, miscegenetic, or made void by a
"RESTATEMENT, CoNFIcT OF LAws (1934), Sec. 130.
Is Ibid, Sec. 132.
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statute of the domciliary state, is the view of the Court of
Appeals. 9
Generally speaking, a marriage will be recognized in the
state where it is solemnized although it was entered into
in violation of a prohibition in a divorce decree granted in
another state. 0 Obviously, however, the marriage could not
be recognized as valid if under the statute of the other state
the prior marriage was deemed not to be dissolved until
the expiration of a waiting period. 1 The usual rule seems
to be that in the absence of a statute of the domiciliary state
expressly regulating marriage abroad, the statute of the
place where it is solemnized governs the validity of the
marriage, unless held to be odious to public policy,52 but a
marriage that is void where it is solemnized will not be
recognized in another states.5
UNILATERAL MISTAKE AS DEFENSE TO SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE - MEASURE OF DAMAGES
RECOVERABLE BY VENDEE AT LAW
Kappelman v. Bowie'
Defendants-appellees, husband and wife, with little edu-
cation or business experience, signed a standard multiple
listing contract with a real estate broker, authorizing the
sale of property for $9,500, subject to a $90 ground rent to
be created; the property had cost them $8,500 and they had
spent some $2,000 in repairs and improvements. Subse-
quently, they were told by an agent of the broker that they
would have to take less money to secure a cash sale. There-
after the agent submitted an offer to buy in fee for $7,500
cash, in the form of a standard contract prepared by the
11 See the Maryland case of Bannister v. Bannister, 181 Md. 177, 29 A. 2d
287 (1942), noted in 7 Md. L. Rev. 254 (1943), which shows the willing-
ness of the Court of Appeals to apply these principles.
10In re Ommang's Estate, 183 Minn. 92, 235 N. W. 529 (1931), criticized
in 16 Minn. L. Rev. 172, 184 (1932). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws
(1934), Sec. 13L illustration 2, which would decide the first point in the
instant case the other way.
61 Johnson v. State Compensation Commissioner, 116 W. Va. 232, 179
S. E. 814 (1935).
2Earle v. Earle, 141 App. Div. 611, 126 N. Y. Supp. 317 (1910).
Huard v. MeTeigh, 8upra, n. 43.
201 Md. 86, 93 A. 2d 266 (1952).
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